HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
March 1, 2005 Hearing Room 357
1:00 P.M. Tape 20 - 22
MEMBERS PRESENT: Rep. John Dallum, Chair
Rep. Jerry Krummel, Vice-Chair
Rep. Brad Witt
MEMBERS EXCUSED: Rep. Kelley Wirth, Vice-Chair
Rep. Chuck Burley
STAFF PRESENT: Dallas Weyand, Committee Administrator
Louann Rahmig, Committee Assistant
MEASURES/ISSUES HEARD:
Information Technology Security and Audits – Informational Meeting
These minutes are in compliance with Senate and House Rules. Only text enclosed in quotation marks reports a speaker’s exact words. For complete contents, please refer to the tapes.
TAPE/# |
Speaker |
Comments |
TAPE 20, A |
||
004 |
Chair Dallum |
Calls the meeting to order at 1:00 p.m. Announces that presentations will be limited to 20 minutes each. Opens an informational meeting on information technology security and audits. |
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND AUDITS – INFORMATIONAL MEETING |
||
017 |
Chuck Hibner |
Deputy, Secretary of State Audits Division. Presents overview of the division’s responsibilities, which include information technology (IT), financial and performance audits. |
045 |
Hibner |
Explains that staff are obtaining certified information systems audit certifications. Describes the division’s annual audit plan, from which projects are selected based on risk analyses. |
068 |
Hibner |
Advises that audit findings are publicly released with recommendations, except when the information would put the system at risk. |
080 |
Neal Weatherspoon |
Oregon Secretary of State Audits Division. Provides more detail on the IT audit process. |
111 |
Weatherspoon |
Points out that the standards have changed for the way business is conducted by auditors. |
125 |
Weatherspoon |
Informs that the division performs reviews of systems with statewide implications, such as the payroll system, public employees’ retirement system and data archives center. Indicates that increasing public access poses great risk. |
132 |
Weatherspoon |
Advises that the division classifies itself as an external auditor independent from the agencies audited and describes the standards used for financial and performance audits. |
178 |
Weatherspoon |
Continues by expressing concerns with controls associated with day to day integrity and the cost of system development. |
208 |
Weatherspoon |
Comments on disaster recovery and contingency planning. Advises that the division has performed IT audits on several state agencies and the university system. Invites members to review the division’s web site for audit reports. |
254 |
Linda Haglund |
Deputy State Treasurer. Provides overview of the office’s responsibilities, all of which are IT dependent. Gives statistics on annual transactions. Advises that Treasury keeps track of all the state, local government, municipality, county and school district debt in an overlapping debt program. |
297 |
Haglund |
Continues by describing the investment holdings that are tracked. |
320 |
Haglund |
Describes agency security. Explains that internal audit staff does an annual risk assessment, and IT staff are dedicated to watching the network fulltime to identify attempts to access their system. |
345 |
Haglund |
Continues with information on their network, which has a strong perimeter to prevent outsiders from accessing the system. Refers to a recent state-driven penetration test and the fact that the firewall held up to the attack attempt. |
370 |
Haglund |
Believes that the best testing is done by a third party to avoid manipulation by internal staff or collusion with other agencies. |
420 |
Haglund |
Describes a recent penetration test and review of physical security by a third-party from the Department of Administrative Services (DAS) approved list of vendors. |
TAPE 21, A |
||
048 |
Haglund |
Continues with explanation of test which looked at the physical location of systems, access controls and practices of sensitive information. Stresses the importance of using a highly qualified vendor that would not cause system failure during testing. |
058 |
Haglund |
Closes with comments that at Treasury security over financial transactions and information is critical. |
067 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks about the handling of local and state government outstanding debt. |
073 |
Haglund |
Replies that Treasury does not handle payment of local government debt but tracks overlapping debt issuances. Explains that they manage all of the state’s debt from centralized issuance and contracts for the fiscal agent, the mechanism by which bond coupon payments are paid. |
083 |
Rep. Krummel |
Inquires at what level the state-sponsored attack was stopped. |
089 |
Haglund |
Responds that the attack did not penetrate the initial firewall. |
094 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks about the provisions for systems being patched to continue a high level of security. |
105 |
Haglund |
Answers that there are two internal audit staff plus one fulltime network monitor. Explains further that the individual who monitors the network is responsible for staying current on all releases, and an automated system has been implemented for installation of patches. |
128 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks if Treasury is consolidating into the data center, and if so, would some of the security issues be resolved. |
133 |
Haglund |
Replies that Treasury is not part of the initial consolidation and does not know if there are any unique aspects of Treasury’s functions that would need to be addressed. |
142 |
Chair Dallum |
Inquires how often a new third party vendor would be sought. |
150 |
Haglund |
Responds, every time if adequate skill sets were available. |
153 |
Chair Dallum |
Asks if Treasury would put out for bid. |
157 |
Haglund |
Answers, that is correct. |
158 |
Chair Dallum |
Inquires if the outside evaluation is completely independent of any other state agency. |
159 |
Haglund |
Responds, that is correct. |
160 |
Chair Dallum |
Inquires if there is an advantage to using an outside agency. |
161 |
Haglund |
Answers that Treasury’s objective is to have a robust test and to use the most experienced resources to perform it. |
171 |
Chair Dallum |
Asks if the Secretary of State audits Treasury. |
172 |
Haglund |
Replies, yes. |
174 |
Chair Dallum |
Seeks clarification that Treasury uses an internal ongoing audit, a Secretary of State audit and an outside audit, which provides three different looks at the office. |
179 |
Haglund |
Answers, yes. |
190 |
Theresa Masse |
Head of Cyber Security, DAS. Refers to written information titled Protecting Confidential State Information Assets (EXHIBIT A). Describes how security has been handled in the past, which was very agency-centric (EXHIBIT A, Page 1). Explains that DAS had a vulnerability assessment in 2004. |
224 |
Masse |
Continues that a decentralized approach lacks an objective assessment of risk exposure and does not allow adequate priority and resource allocation (EXHIBIT A, Page 2). |
239 |
Masse |
Refers to the current model (EXHIBIT A, Page 3). Advises that the vulnerability assessment has created a sense of urgency. Explains the Immediate Action Plan (IAP). |
258 |
Masse |
Advises that agency directors are involved with several committees to implement the IAP. |
276 |
Masse |
Continues by explaining the enterprise security planning process (EXHIBIT A, Page 4). |
289 |
Masse |
Outlines the hybrid model for the future (EXHIBIT A, Page 5). |
309 |
Masse |
Discusses coordination of security programs with federal and local governments and business partners to maximize efficiency. |
319 |
Masse |
Provides examples of coordination (EXHIBIT A, Page 6). |
337 |
Masse |
Refers to the future model (EXHIBIT A, Page 7). Points out that coordination with Homeland Security and the Oregon State Police is necessary. |
348 |
Don Fleming |
State Chief Information Officer, DAS. Discusses immediate areas of concern (EXHIBIT A, Page 8). States the implementation of the Computing and Networking Infrastructure Consolidation (CNIC) project will decrease the “weakest link” issue, which is the decentralized agency approach to security. Believes statutory authority, administrative rules and changes to the business model will be required to ensure a secure infrastructure. |
371 |
Fleming |
Continues with information on areas of assessment and monitoring (EXHIBIT A, Page 9). |
409 |
Fleming |
Expresses that multiple vulnerability assessments are not cost-effective and can be potentially harmful. |
427 |
Fleming |
Explains that the suggested approach is to utilize highly competent third-party vendors, who are most current on attack scenarios and vulnerabilities, to perform assessments on a centralized basis. |
TAPE 20, B |
||
007 |
Fleming |
Continues that dissemination of information would be on a “need to know” basis. Cites an example of an “attack” on a research laboratory and subsequent vulnerability assessment. |
034 |
Fleming |
Discusses incident response (EXHIBIT A, Page 10). Believes a team of highly trained experts must be created that will have extraordinary authorities to respond to an attack. Outlines the types of authorities needed to be effective. |
077 |
Fleming |
Continues with audit issue remediation (EXHIBIT A, Page 11). Discusses agency responses to audit report findings. Suggests making remediation plans mandatory, including follow-up to see that the plan was implemented and effective in eliminating the findings. |
109 |
Fleming |
Refers to house rules (EXHIBIT A, Page 12). States that through a collaborative effort, rules must be established and followed. Cites some examples. |
143 |
Fleming |
Concludes that the existing problems are self inflicted and must be managed more effectively. Expresses concern about uncoordinated, multiple organizations conducting vulnerability assessments, as they can be dangerous and disruptive. |
177 |
Greg Hutchins |
Quality Plus Engineering. Describes his company, which does risk management assessments for federal and private clients. Begins a PowerPoint presentation titled Oregon Cyber Security and provides a hard copy (EXHIBIT B). |
202 |
Hutchins |
Points out the differences between east and west coast mind sets, and that the federal government believes cyber security is a homeland security issue. |
245 |
Hutchins |
Discusses hacking. |
257 |
Hutchins |
Quotes from CIO Magazine (EXHIBIT B, Page 3). |
275 |
Hutchins |
Continues by discussing what is at stake for Oregon and dissemination of unwanted information (EXHIBIT B, Page 4). |
302 |
Hutchins |
Points out that the threshold of “due care” has changed between pre-9/11 and post-9/11. |
337 |
Hutchins |
Defines “due care” (EXHIBIT B, Page 5). |
374 |
Hutchins |
Cites credentials needed to meet higher standard of “due care.” |
TAPE 21, B |
||
010 |
Hutchins |
Outlines professional proficiency of accountants and engineers (EXHIBIT B, Page 6). |
022 |
Hutchins |
Discusses Certified Information Systems Auditor requirements (EXHIBIT B, Page 7). |
033 |
Hutchins |
Defines half life of knowledge. |
047 |
Hutchins |
Summarizes what Oregon should do. |
075 |
Chair Dallum |
Asks if Quality Plus Engineering is on the state-approved vendor list. |
076 |
Hutchins |
Replies, yes. |
78 |
Chair Dallum |
Inquires if the company has done any audits for the state on IT security. |
079 |
Hutchins |
Responds, no, but has done an eco-evaluation assessment. |
082 |
Rep. Witt |
Asks how we can expect to keep up. |
089 |
Hutchins |
Believes it is important to move from a collaborative environment to a control system environment, as it is necessary for someone to be accountable. |
103 |
Rep. Witt |
Agrees that there is the appearance of great need for a security system to run security for the state. |
108 |
Hutchins |
States that the way business is done will change in the next five years. |
114 |
Rep. Witt |
Asks if internal security systems need to be parallel systems, similar to the type used in a casino. |
11 8 |
Hutchins |
Responds that there needs to be redundancies. |
126 |
Chair Dallum |
Summarizes testimony from DAS and Treasury regarding authority to shut down systems, seize, isolate and inoculate, using a combination of internal staff and a third party. Asks if that is the type of redundancy needed. |
139 |
Hutchins |
Responds that operational controls are needed, not auditing controls. |
144 |
Chair Dallum |
Restates Treasury’s process which provides internal daily monitoring, the Secretary of State’s level of security and a periodic third-party assessment. Asks if that system is redundant enough. |
162 |
Hutchins |
Responds, should be. |
165 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks if Quality Plus Engineering has a Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) employee. |
167 |
Hutchins |
Answers, no. |
171 |
Rep. Krummel |
Believes that a CISSP has the level of understanding of information security that is important. States that it is not uncommon for an engineer to have CISSP credentials. |
185 |
Rep. Witt |
Asks for a description of the management controls needed to be engineered into the security system that may not now be there. |
192 |
Hutchins |
Replies culture of controls and culture of due diligence. Indicates there is no sense of accountability, which is the toughest challenge in any type of security. |
207 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks if the Secretary of State Audits Division staff who perform information systems audits have CISSP credentials. |
220 |
Hibner |
Responds that Mr. Weatherspoon does and the division is developing those credentials. |
240 |
Rep. Krummel |
Asks Mr. Weatherspoon if he has an engineering degree as well as the CISSP. |
244 |
Weatherspoon |
Replies, no, and cites credentials, training and background experience. |
279 |
Weatherspoon |
Continues that no one at the Audits Division has engineering knowledge and contract for it if needed. |
288 |
Rep. Krummel |
Inquires if an engineer with software background and a security systems professional certification would be included in an agency security system or cyber security system audit. |
310 |
Weatherspoon |
Responds that the level of expertise needed would be in proportion to the level of audit so may need to contract out. |
340 |
Rep. Krummel |
Seeks clarification that consultation with agencies to be audited takes place to determine whether a third party is needed to assist with an audit. |
359 |
Weatherspoon |
Answers, yes; security is a team effort. |
392 |
Chair Dallum |
Summarizes the various agency processes and asks if the Audits Division uses an outside agency to look at its IT. |
431 |
Hibner |
Replies that IT could better answer that question. |
433 |
Chair Dallum |
Summarizes processes and asks about suitable proposed legislation. |
440 |
Hibner |
Seeks clarification. |
TAPE 22, A |
||
010 |
Chair Dallum |
Describes a four-level plan to insure the state’s IT security. Asks if the plan sounds reasonable. |
027 |
Weatherspoon |
Responds that a multi-layered approach is necessary. Believes every organization needs a security officer to keep vigilant watch for vulnerabilities and threats. |
050 |
Chair Dallum |
Asks if they concur. |
051 |
Weatherspoon |
Replies, believe we do. |
061 |
Chair Dallum |
States that it appears a state agency needs the authority to “pull the plug.” |
070 |
Weatherspoon |
Comments on the generally accepted controls for security. |
076 |
Chair Dallum |
Summarizes the planned procedures for security. |
The following material is submitted for the record without public testimony: |
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|
Dallas Weyand |
Secretary of State Audits Division agency protocol (EXHIBIT C). |
080 |
Chair Dallum |
Closes the informational meeting on information technology security and audits and adjourns at 2:58 p.m. |
EXHIBIT SUMMARY
The following material is submitted for the record without public testimony: